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**SOVIET MILITARY, NAVAL
AND
AIR REPRESENTATIVES
IN
THE UNITED STATES**

Covert Operational Methods

February 1955

**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
John Edgar Hoover, Director**

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PREFACE

This monograph is concerned with operational methods relating to the covert intelligence activities of Soviet military, naval and air representatives stationed in the United States 1950-1954. The purpose of this study is not just to develop a perspective of the part played by these representatives in the covert intelligence picture, but, more importantly, to study the nature of their covert operational methods.

The activities under scrutiny are not being viewed as operations of a particular Soviet intelligence service, but rather as covert intelligence operations under the cover of the Foreign Relations Section (Otdel Vneshnikh Snoshenii, OVS) of the Soviet armed forces in the United States.

In order to better understand the nature of this operational cover, the OVS, we must briefly review some of its features.

Another United States intelligence agency which conducts inquiry abroad has supplied information regarding the OVS, which is pertinent to this study. The OVS of the Soviet armed forces has been in existence for a number of years and its historical changes have been related to the organizational changes in the Soviet armed forces.

According to this source, when the Ministry of the Armed Forces (Ministerstvo Vooruzhennykh Sil, MVS) early in 1946 succeeded the separate

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Commissariats for Defense and Navy, the two Foreign Relations Sections (OVS) appear to have been consolidated into a single section, the OVS MVS.* In 1950, when the MVS was separated into a Ministry of the Navy and a Ministry of War, there appeared to be a separate OVS for each ministry. Since the consolidation of the two services under the Ministry of Defense (Ministerstvo Oborony, MO) in March 1953, only one OVS has been identified with this ministry, the OVS MO.

In addition to supplying information regarding the organizational development of the OVS, the afore-mentioned source has identified the responsibilities of this organization. The OVS has responsibilities which may be characterized as both foreign and domestic.

Domestically, the OVS provides liaison between the various foreign military, naval and air attaches and the Soviet General Staff. In this monograph we are concerned only with the foreign or external responsibilities of the OVS as they apply to our topic.

Little is known concerning the organizational features of the OVS in the Soviet armed forces since the formation of the Ministry of Defense (MO) in March 1953. Available information indicates that historically

*The Ministry of the Armed Forces was known as the People's Commissariat of the Armed Forces (NKVS) for approximately one month prior to the discarding of the term "Commissariat" by the Soviets in March 1946.

the OVS has provided a camouflage through which the Soviets could operate covert and overt intelligence activities in the United States. In order to give official sanction to certain of its overt functions, the OVS is identified with the central military organization. In order to provide for its covert, external intelligence activities, according to our source, the OVS was made responsible to the Intelligence Directorate (Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye, RU) of the Soviet armed forces.

With this OVS cover in mind, we approach an inspection of the operational techniques utilized in covert intelligence operations by the Soviet military, naval and air representatives stationed in Washington, D. C., 1950-1954.

This monograph includes no public source data. All of the material in this study is classified "Confidential" or "Secret."

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

SUMMARY

Soviet military, naval and air representatives in the United States during the period covered by this monograph have utilized covert operational methods to carry out a phase of their intelligence acquisition efforts. The stigma of their overt identification with the Soviet establishment was neutralized by a system of recruiting and developing indigenous agents* to substitute for the Soviet agents in the direct acquisition of the desired data. The area between their intelligence-producing agents or sources was bridged by communication and travel techniques designed to secure these operations against counterintelligence efforts.

Although these Soviet activities presented a maze of precautionary and evasive security tactics, the Soviets have demonstrated personal and organizational weaknesses which may assist in combating this counterintelligence problem.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Soviet military, naval and air representatives in the United States, under the cover of a Foreign Relations Section (OVS) of the Soviet armed forces, have engaged in covert intelligence operations.

*Agents who, because of their natural residence in the United States, could give an innocuous appearance while carrying out Soviet objectives.

2. In order to carry out their objectives, these Soviet representatives have recruited the services of indigenous agents.

3. In the period under consideration, these Soviet representatives utilized a broad variation of contacts from conservative and well-organized "spotting" procedures to bold and flimsy contacts during the course of their overt business and social activities.

4. Mercenary and not ideological lures were utilized to develop a sustaining motivation for recruits. The actual rewards were short of Soviet promises.

5. Paralleling the progressive development of the agent's intelligence-producing potential and clandestine operational methods was the development toward more sensitive target data.

6. Although the Soviets utilized various precautionary and evasive tactics in connection with their communication and travel, the personal contact method of communication was widely used.

7. The covert meeting locales of these Soviet representatives and their agents or potential agents may be classified in the following categories: City Streets; Restaurants or Hotel Dining Rooms; Automobiles; Isolated Areas or Parks; Hotel and Building Lobbies; Soviet Residences or Establishments; Movies; Railroad or Air Terminals; and Addresses of Agents.

8. Soviet personal and organizational weaknesses may assist in combating this counterintelligence problem.

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I. RECRUITMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

A. General

Soviet military, naval and air representatives in the United States have utilized their "legal" presence to overtly and directly acquire a mass of intelligence data. This is but one important phase of their activity. Several of these representatives have extended their intelligence acquisition activities to those of a more clandestine nature.

Although their official Soviet positions supplied a "legal" cover for much of their overt collection activities, this "legal" cover concurrently served as a deterrent in their attempts to acquire directly certain sensitive intelligence data. These Soviet representatives have evidenced a desire to neutralize this deterrent by various means to deceive information-producing sources. This neutralization was attempted by various methods, such as misrepresentation, half representation calculated to indicate an erroneous identification of the Soviet, and outright refusals or neglect of the Soviet representatives to properly identify themselves.

If these methods of neutralization were ineffectual, there still remained the more cumbersome and delicate clandestine intelligence operations. This involved the activation of intelligence-producing sources through a substitute who had not been identified with the Soviet establishment.

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This substitute in the operations reviewed was personified by agents who, because of their natural residence in the United States, could give an innocuous appearance while carrying out Soviet objectives. These agents are frequently called indigenous agents.

B. Potential Agent Material

A review of the activities within the scope of this study revealed that, during the early 1950's, the Soviet representatives involved utilized a more conservative procedure for "spotting" potential recruits. The potential agent material identified with Soviet recruitment activities was centered in indigenous persons with whom the Soviets had previous or current dealings. These dealings were based on both governmental and commercial relationships. The selection or "spotting" of talent in these categories did not only supply the Soviet with a possible previous appraisal of the potential recruit, but also supplied a pretext or cover for necessary initial contacts.

In early 1951, a former "civilian" employee in the office of the Soviet military attache was utilized in "spotting" or initial contact functions. He made initial contact with two persons who had former military liaison relationships with other Soviet representatives. The pretext utilized by the Soviet making these initial "spotting" contacts was the delivery of a gift or message to the potential recruit from the respective former Soviet

acquaintance. During the course of the pretext contact, the "spotter" laid the groundwork for subsequent contacts with these persons by still other Soviet representatives in the United States.

Generally, the operations reviewed indicated that the recruitment was initiated and developed by the same Soviet. In some instances, there was not only a pretext for initial contacts, but also an overt basis for a subsequent "logical" association. A "civilian" employee in the office of the Soviet naval attache during 1950 was able to utilize a commercial situation as a means for initial and subsequent "logical" contacts.

Another source of potential agent material were those agents suggested wittingly or unwittingly by agents already under Soviet control. In one such instance, the Soviet principal gave the agent specific assignments with the objective of identifying potential agents or sources in certain establishments.

More recently, the Soviets under consideration have indicated a less conservative approach to potential agents. They have attempted to initiate relationships on the basis of some flimsy common ground.

Two Soviet assistant military attaches, who attended a convention for radio engineers in March, 1953, demonstrated a rather bold and flimsy approach. In one instance, upon ascertaining that an exhibitor at the convention had a Russian name, they immediately started questioning him

about his background. In addition, they desired to know if this exhibitor was interested in attending social functions at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C. Another of their targets involved a person who presented a technical paper to this convention. After this person identified himself as a native of Russia, one of the attaches immediately contacted this person and, after identifying himself as a Soviet representative, asked the person in question if he would like to talk to him.

During the past year, two Soviet assistant air attaches attempted to initiate relationships with persons by still another flimsy method. Their selected common grounds with these persons were in the nature of claims that they had seen the person at a certain professional meeting or the potential contact had been suggested to them by another party.

In recent months, these Soviet representatives have been identified with a variety of "casual" contacts with persons who ostensibly might be in a position to serve Soviet intelligence interests. Although all of these contacts have not matured into covert intelligence operations, they may represent a "spotting" of potential recruits for their covert operations.

The Soviet military, naval and air representatives, all, have been represented in this "casual" contact activity. In September, 1954, an employee of the Soviet naval attache's office initiated an acquaintance with a chemical engineer on a golf course. During this same period, a

Soviet assistant air attache initiated an acquaintance with an electronics engineer at a cocktail party given by the embassy of a non-Soviet bloc country. In addition, this Soviet made a contact with an air museum employee. In still another field, a Soviet assistant military attache initiated a series of contacts with an employee of a transportation publication.

During the following month, contacts of this nature continued. An assistant air attache developed a relationship with an aeronautical manufacturer's representative. The setting for this initial contact was a reception at a Soviet satellite embassy. Just before parting, the Soviet boldly indicated that he expected some information from this individual the next time they met.

Also in October 1954, an employee of the Soviet naval attache's office contacted an individual at his home in response to a newspaper advertisement. The advertisement concerned the sale of radio equipment.

In the period under consideration, the Soviet representatives have utilized a broad variation of contacts from conservative and well-organized "spotting" procedures to bold and flimsy contacts during the course of their overt business and social activities. In their approaches to potential agent material, ideological sympathies were not identified with the motivating considerations. Instead, the Soviets indicated intelligence interests in persons who possessed the potentiality of producing specialized

or sensitive intelligence data.

In connection with the more organized approaches made by these Soviet representatives, a suitable pretext or cover situation was present. Although a "spotter" was utilized in some highly organized contacts, the Soviet representative handling the initial contact was likely to be handling the subsequent examination and development of the potential recruit.

C. Examination and Development

After the initial contacts and the identification of a common ground for future relationships, the Soviet representative proceeded to examine and develop the potentialities of the contact. This was carried out during the course of an ingratiating social relationship. The examinations were accomplished during the course of dinner and drinking engagements, accompanied by small gifts, selected bits of pro-Soviet propaganda, and in some instances more direct mercenary lures. This technique might well serve a dual purpose. First, it would tend to neutralize resistance to questioning. Secondly, it would tend to contribute to a harmonious relationship between the Soviet and his potential agent.

The examination of potential agents by the various Soviet military, naval and air representatives has not followed any rigid pattern. During the early contacts with a potential recruit or persons in whom they have indicated an intelligence interest, the Soviets have developed certain types

of information. This included background data regarding the potential agent and his contacts, his potentialities for producing intelligence data, an indication of his political feelings, and perhaps an indication of some motivation and control factors.

Concurrently, there was evidence of Soviet attempts to develop the potential agent. In addition to developing a stronger relationship with the potential agent, the Soviets developed the agent's motivation, fuller potentialities for producing intelligence data, and adjustments to covert operational methods. The operations considered indicated that a strong personal relationship might serve as a basis for innocent-appearing intelligence requests under quasi-clandestine operating conditions. However, stronger motivation and control factors were developed with the paralleling development of sensitive intelligence targets and clandestine operating techniques.

D. Motivation and Control

Closely akin to the examination and development of a potential agent is the identification and development of motivation and control factors. Certainly, these factors are important components in a sustained intelligence operation.

In the activities studied, there was an absence of strong ideological motivations and control by coercion. Instead, the prime

motivation and control factors were of a mercenary nature. These mercenary factors were exhibited in terms of gifts, entertainment and money. However, the identified mercenary interests were more concentrated in the actual or promised money payments for services of an intelligence nature.

There were various methods for motivating a stronger interest on the part of the indigenous agent. In one operation, the Soviet principal regularly entertained the agent at dinner and plied him with gifts. This might have given the Soviet some semblance of control over the agent. However, the real stimulus for motivation suggested by this operation was the promise of substantial money payments for greater intelligence accomplishments.

Another Soviet representative used a different technique for developing an indigenous agent. The Soviet paid the agent substantial sums for routine services during the first stage of development and made promises of exorbitant sums for future activities of a more sensitive nature. A succeeding Soviet principal in the same operation used a technique which was in direct contradiction of that used by the first principal. Instead of continuing the liberality of the first principal, the successor continually owed this agent funds, used delaying tactics to keep from prompt settlement of accounts with the agent, and even attempted to get the agent to advance large expenditures to facilitate the acquisition of certain intelligence

material. The third Soviet principal assumed a compromise position between these two extremes.

Although some Soviet principals made strong implications or promises regarding the availability of fantastic subsidies for their agents, the actual general pattern followed that of a close accounting on a collect-on-delivery basis. The payment might at first be termed a gift or just identified as remuneration for expenses. As the operations developed, the payments might fall into two general categories. The first dealt with expenses incurred by the indigenous agent in connection with the intelligence operation; the second, the payment of a reward for services performed. In some instances, itemized expenses and signed receipts were required of the indigenous agent. In any event, the actual payments to the agent were always made in cash.

In the early and what might be termed development stage of an intelligence recruitment, there was evidenced in many instances a parallel social relationship. This social relationship usually took the form of dinner engagements. In addition to the drinking and dining which accompanied many of these relationships, the Soviet might attempt to further ingratiate himself with the potential agent by presenting gifts and making promises of materialistic opportunity to insure continued interest of the agent. Although these features presented more immediate motivations for the agent, some Soviets were interested in developing a supplemental motivation, a sympathy

for the Soviet Union. A principal involved in a long-term operation with an indigenous agent referred his agent to writings of V. I. Lenin, the Communist revolutionary and Soviet leader, and to the Daily Worker, an east coast Communist newspaper. Further, this Soviet spoke of "peaceful coexistence," spoke disparagingly of the way of life in the United States, and one step further, indulged in comparing life in the United States unfavorably with the Soviet Union.

In some instances in the operations reviewed, the brief associations between the Soviets and potential recruits did not clearly indicate the motivating factor of the latter. Whether the initial motivating factors were curiosity, personal friendship, an unstated ideological sympathy, or mercenary objectives, the Soviet representatives persistently developed a mercenary motivation and control.

E. Target Assignments

In making intelligence assignments, the Soviet principal is ostensibly identifying specific intelligence interests or requirements of the Soviet Union. The pattern of intelligence assignments may also indicate another operational consideration, the state of development of the particular recruit or agent.

In the operations considered, the target assignments involved two important factors. The first, the scope of the agent's intelligence-

producing potentialities and secondly, the progressive development of the agent toward more sensitive target data.

With the development of the agent or potential agent, the Soviet principal progressively took fuller advantage of the agent's sources or potential sources. This included professed contacts of the agent who might conceivably have access to certain data. In exceptional circumstances, where a suitable pretext was available to the agent, he was requested to develop new contacts beyond the indicated scope of his potentiality.

Paralleling the progressive development of the agent's intelligence-producing potential and clandestine operational methods was a development toward more sensitive target data. In this connection, although the target requests were not always specific, they generally fell within the previously identified potentialities of the agent.

II. COMMUNICATION

A. General

The successful development of intelligence-producing sources or agents was but one step in the formation of a basic intelligence apparatus. Next, a medium for traversing the area between the intelligence-producing source or agent and the Soviet principal was established. Basic media for accomplishing this were various forms of communication.

Although the operations under consideration did not employ all forms of communication which have been identified with general Soviet covert intelligence operations, several methods with interesting variations have been identified. In order to organize our appraisal of these various communication media, they are being considered in two categories. They are first, oral communication and secondly, visual communication.

B. Oral Communication

1. Personal Contact

A simple and basic means of communication utilized by representatives of the Soviet armed forces in connection with their covert intelligence activities was communication by personal contact. This type of communication became more fully identified with their initial operating phases of recruiting, examining and developing agent material. Although

it continued as a method of contact and communication in some operations, it was accompanied by cumbersome security tactics and signals.

With the development of clandestine intelligence tactics, the oral communication of complex and detailed security data was not adequate. It was more frequently utilized to supplement and interpret data passed through other forms of communication. In addition, direct oral communication during personal contact between the Soviet principal and his agent remained the frequently used system for smoothing out problems and planning covert intelligence operations. *

2. Telephonic Contact

Soviet representatives indicated the use of telephonic communication for intelligence purposes as undesirable. One Soviet principal labeled this form of communication "dangerous." Perhaps, as a device for better control of this communication medium, the Soviet representatives generally refused by one pretext or another to supply their agents and contacts with a means for reaching them telephonically. In some exceptional cases, where the new agent had prior knowledge of a means to contact the Soviet telephonically, the Soviet specifically instructed or strongly suggested that the persons involved should not use this form of communication to reach the Soviet.

*This topic is more fully considered in connection with the topic "Meetings."

Telephonic communication was utilized by these Soviet representatives in connection with the early social phases of their relationships with potential agent material. However, there were other uses to which this medium of communication could be adapted in connection with the more sensitive phases of their operations. These other uses involved the specialized use of the telephone for oral signals and the transmission of messages in segments.

An example of the signal device was a telephone call to the agent from the Soviet principal to indicate whether intelligence data from another source had been received. If, during the telephone conversation, the Soviet delivered a pleasant message, it would signal an acknowledgment that the data had been received. An unpleasant message would signal that the data had not been received.

In another instance, this signal system was utilized to indicate whether the agent would be able to consummate the scheduled meeting.

Another technique was to transmit the desired message in segments. One application of this system was to supplement by one telephone call a plan which had been partially planned during the course of a previous personal contact. In one operation, the Soviet and his agent telephonically discussed the time and date of a proposed meeting. It was unnecessary to discuss the place of the meeting as it had been agreed on previously. Another

application of the segment message system was to utilize more than one telephone call to convey the message. With this arrangement, the first call might determine the date of the proposed meeting and the second call, the time and place of the meeting.

Although telephonic contact was frowned upon by these Soviet representatives, they utilized this medium of communication when they were able to maintain a control over the conditions of its use.

C. Visual Communication

1. Personal Contact

As has been previously indicated, oral communication during the course of personal contact between the Soviet principal and his agent was not adequate for the communication of complex or detailed intelligence data. In the course of the operations reviewed, the visual data communicated by the agent to his Soviet principal during the course of personal contact took the written, printed or photographic form.

Little concern was indicated by the Soviet principals regarding the possibility that intelligence data might be found on the person of the agent. On the contrary, the Soviet principals were quite sensitive to their own security while in the possession of visual communication data. In August, 1951 and May, 1953, two different Soviet assistant air attaches

openly indicated a reluctance to accept printed intelligence data during the course of a personal contact with their agents. This sensitivity was further evidenced by hiding written or printed data in their personal clothing, under a ring, in a shoe or in a small cylindrical container.

This sensitivity was more fully evidenced by the various other means utilized for communication of visual intelligence data.*

2. United States Mail

Soviet interests in this category of communication were indicated or developed along two lines. One was the developing of "mail drops" to act as a "cut out" in the communication relationship between the Soviet principal and his agent or source. The other development was along the line of direct communication, but concealing the nature of the relationship and the content of the message by a prearranged means.

Although Soviet naval and air representatives indicated special interests in developing "mail drops," little success was achieved along this line. This might have been due to the lack of persistent efforts by these Soviets to successfully develop this technique. More persistent interest was displayed in a system of direct communication with the benefit of camouflage.

In August 1950, an employee of the Soviet naval attaché's office, who was operating an indigenous agent, instructed the latter to *This topic is more fully considered in connection with the topic "Meetings."

have printed a supply of advertising cards. The following month a system involving the use of these cards was put into effect. This system involved direct communication with a Soviet establishment in an innocuous manner. The communication conveyed previously agreed upon signals to the Soviet principal.

This innocuous advertising card which was a part of the system was addressed to the "Naval Attaché of the USSR." In order to insure receipt of the indicated signals on the advertising card, the indigenous agent was required to mail a second card from a different postal zone. Signals transmitted with the card would be in the nature of a code letter designating the place of the meeting or the cache to be utilized for passing intelligence data. Another signal would be indicated by the postmark on the card. The meeting would occur on the third day following the date appearing in the postmark.

This system also provided for communication from the Soviet to his agent. If the Soviet wished to signal a meeting with the agent, he would merely send a particular picture post card to him. In the upper right-hand corner of this card, near the stamp, would appear the coded letter indicating the place of the proposed meeting. The date in the postmark would be utilized as before to indicate the date of the meeting.

Although the Soviet principal initiating the operation indicated that the card system worked well for other Soviets, he dropped it as a failure in connection with this operation. A subsequent Soviet principal briefly reactivated this idea but only for emergency situations. In the event of an emergency situation, the indigenous agent would mail a post card to the Soviet official establishment and signal his request for a meeting on the following Saturday by merely eliminating certain punctuation from the address on the card. The Soviet principal could indicate a desire for an emergency meeting by sending what might appear to be a normal business letter to his agent. This letter would bear a particular code name for the sender.

The Soviet use of the mails did not indicate an organized use of this means for the covert transmission of intelligence data or products, but rather, for the transmission of covert operational messages.

3. Caches

Soviet reluctance to utilize the previously indicated avenues of communication for the transmission of sensitive intelligence data between the Soviet and his agent was evidenced by the use of labored security precautions and the development of a cache system. The cache system provided a relatively secure means for the passage of bulky intelligence data or intelligence products. Ostensibly this would minimize the danger of identifying the relationship between the Soviet principal and his agent.

At the same time, the cache system might serve as a substitute for other cumbersome techniques such as encoding voluminous intelligence data.

The cache took two general forms in the operations reviewed. First, the stationary cache was found as a hole in the ground, a hole in a stone wall, empty cans deposited near specific fire hydrants, and luggage lockers at railroad terminals. The other general form, the mobile cache, was represented in the form of Soviet-owned automobiles.

In August 1950, a Soviet representative advised his indigenous agent that, due to the tense international situation, it would be better if they were not seen together. As a substitute to the personal contact form of communication, this Soviet instituted a cache system. This system involved the use of two holes in the ground. Each hole was located near a large east coast city. Intelligence data was to be passed by depositing the material in one of these holes. Communication regarding the use of these caches was effected by agreed-upon signals transmitted through the mails.

Almost immediately after this system was devised for this operation, the Soviet principal modified it. This modification was allegedly based on the fear that the material placed in the caches by the indigenous agent might be discovered or damaged by water. This resulted in the cache being utilized as an alternate system. Under the new plan, the Soviet was to meet his agent at the location of the cache to pass the intelligence

material. If the Soviet did not appear according to plan, the agent was to place the intelligence data in the cache and depart.

In April, 1952, another Soviet principal introduced to this operation a more refined cache system. The Soviet instructed that the intelligence material should be passed in the form of undeveloped film. This film was to be wrapped in black paper and further protected by a rubber covering. In turn, this was to be placed in an empty beer can and deposited in a hole in a specific stone wall. A subsequent variation of this system involved placing the cans near particular fire hydrants.

Another form of the stationary cache was the use of railroad terminal luggage lockers. The intelligence data would be placed in a suitcase or portfolio and deposited in a luggage locker. The agent would supply the locker key to his Soviet principal. A Soviet would subsequently salvage the material from the locker.

Two Soviet principals operating out of the Soviet naval attache's office during the early 1950's instituted the mobile cache idea in their covert operations. This system was more adaptable for use on city streets than the previously indicated stationary systems.

In order to provide the cache, the Soviet principal parked his automobile and departed from the immediate area. In accordance with a prearranged plan, the indigenous agent dropped the intelligence data

through the open window of the Soviet's parked automobile. The agent departed from the area without making personal contact with the Soviet.

The second Soviet principal utilized a variation of the automobile cache. This was necessitated by the communication of a bulky electronic tube to the Soviet principal. The Soviet prepared for the execution of this plan by supplying the agent with the necessary automobile keys, the time, date and place for putting into effect this plan. In accordance with this prearranged plan, the Soviet parked an automobile and departed from the area. The indigenous agent subsequently took possession of the automobile, picked up the electronic tube, parked the automobile at a specific location, and departed from the area. The automobile and the electronic tube were then picked up by the Soviets.

Although the cache was primarily utilized for passing intelligence data or intelligence products, it was utilized as a point for passing signals from the indigenous agent to his Soviet principal. This applied to both the mobile and stationary caches.

4. Signal Points

As previously indicated, both oral and visual signals have been transmitted through the various forms of communication. There were signals, however, which used media other than those previously considered. These supplemental media for transmitting signals between the Soviet and

his agent are being considered at this time in terms of signal points.

The signal points identified in connection with the operations under consideration have this in common. These points were equally accessible to the Soviet principal, the indigenous agent and the public generally. As a practical matter, however, the accessibility of the public generally to the signal points was inconsequential, as they could not identify a specific signal point or the terms of its use.

In one form, signal points may be identified with actual meetings between the Soviet principal and his indigenous agent. The persons of the Soviet or his agent, or even an automobile used in connection with the meeting have served as signal points. These signals took the form of blinking automobile headlights, the smoking of a cigarette or a pipe, or the wearing of a specific necktie. If, in a hotel dining room, it might take the form of particular beverages on the Soviets' table.

For the most part, the signals used were not identified with the actual meetings. Instead, they were more concerned with the initiation of an operational plan and subsequent acknowledgement of its completion. During the period 1951-52, a Soviet assistant naval attache utilized a system of marks at designated localities as a means for signaling meetings. The agent was to come to Washington, D. C., from another city and signal his request for a meeting by marking a letter "V" in blue crayon on a specified

white fence. This signal had to appear prior to 7 P. M. on a Saturday evening, as a Soviet representative allegedly checked the signal point at this time. If this signaling arrangement was appropriately consummated, the Soviet principal would meet with his agent at a prearranged location on the same evening.

This system was initiated in July 1951, but a few weeks later the Soviet principal changed the location of the signal point to a post which served as a guardrail along a road. In November 1951, this Soviet provided three different posts which could be utilized as signal points. The agent could select his meeting locale by the selection of a particular post. By January 1952, the agent's marking on the signal point was changed to red and he was advised that the signal point would be checked daily.

During the succeeding months, this Soviet principal and another who followed him developed a complex signal point idea. It was no longer necessary for the agent to come to Washington, D. C., for a signal point. When the agent had material for delivery to his Soviet principal, he was to place a small box with a red wrapping in the rear of his automobile in a manner that made it clearly visible from the outside. Then, he was to park his automobile at a particular location on a New York City street from 9:30 A. M. to 9:35 A. M. on Wednesday morning. This signaled the agent's

intention to pass certain intelligence data by means of previously arranged cache system.

In order to make certain that the Soviets had retrieved the intelligence data placed in the cache, the agent was to check a "Manhattan" telephone directory in a particular tavern. On a certain page of this directory, the word "Manhattan" was to be underlined to indicate the successful completion of the arrangement. Another signal point was a specific public telephone booth. The signal to be given by the Soviet representatives consisted of placing the head of a match in a wad of gum and depositing it on the underside of a shelf in the telephone booth.

In early 1953, an agent's desire for an emergency meeting could be indicated by parking in a particular area and raising the hood of his automobile as if he were having motor trouble. This signal was to be acknowledged by a banana peel at the base of a specified traffic light.

As may be noted from the preceding review, the system of signal points presents numerous and complex possibilities to facilitate security for Soviet communication efforts.

III. TRAVEL

A. General

Both as a supplement and a parallel to the various means of communication, travel was a vital consideration in connection with these covert Soviet intelligence operations. Travel provided another medium for traversing the area between the Soviet military, naval and air representatives in the United States and their intelligence-producing sources and agents.

The Soviet military, naval and air representatives involved in covert activities, during the period covered in this monograph, had little to impede their freedom of travel by any means. If they wished to travel beyond the radius of twenty-five miles outside their headquarters in Washington, D. C., they needed only to notify the appropriate United States Government official forty-eight hours in advance of their intended travel.*

Although these Soviets generally utilized travel to shorten the lines of communication, there were situations in which the contrary was true. Due to reasons of security or convenience, one extended operation minimized intercity travel between New York City and Washington, D. C. by an extension of the organizational apparatus to the New York City area. Soviet employees of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations and the

*The Soviet Ambassador was notified of this regulation on March 10, 1952. On January 3, 1955, the Soviets were notified of further travel restrictions in the United States.

United Nations secretariat were identified with this extended operation. The Soviet assistant naval attache who handled this operation in the Summer of 1952 indicated that the shortening of travel lines merely resulted in further communication problems. The organization in New York City was not properly communicating the intelligence data to him and this interfered with the appropriate handling of his indigenous agent.

B. Modes of Travel

Various modes of both public and private transportation were utilized by these Soviets and their agents. Some of the Soviets indicated a dislike for particular types of transportation, such as intercity transportation by airplane or intracity transportation by taxi. However, generally in the operations reviewed, the automobile was the most common vehicle of transportation.

The Soviets have utilized auto transportation for convenient transportation to isolated areas, for transferring heavy or bulky intelligence material, for conducting some personal contacts between the Soviet and his agent, and as an instrumentality for conducting evasive security tactics. The Soviets generally utilized an auto in the lower-price field without diplomatic identification. The auto utilized in covert activities was usually registered in the name of one of the Soviets engaged in covert activities. If he departed from the United States, the auto might be trans-

ferred to another Soviet in the establishment. The indigenous agents in these operations utilized their personal and business autos or on Soviet instructions rented an auto for a specific intelligence contact.

Although some of the Soviets utilized autos, both as a means of transportation and a meeting locale, their utilization as a meeting locale was evaded by some of the more cautious Soviet representatives. The specific applications of the auto as a meeting locale are considered in more detail under the topic, "Meetings."

IV. MEETINGS

A. General

Under the topic of meetings will be considered the personal contacts between a Soviet representative and his indigenous agent for the apparent furtherance of a covert intelligence objective.

The Soviet military, naval and air representatives in the United States have indicated by their actions and statements that meetings as an operational method presented to them an inherent contradiction. On the one hand, this operational method was desirable as it supplied the Soviet representatives with an opportunity to spot, examine, develop and recruit new intelligence agents. Subsequently, with the establishment of a continuing operation, the meeting method supplied a ready medium for discussion and planning between the Soviet and his agent in furtherance of their venture.

On the other hand, the Soviets indicated a strong contradiction to this simple and efficient method of communication. This contradiction was the fear of adequate operational security in connection with these meetings. On some occasions this fear of insecurity was subtly expressed. During the course of a delicate early relationship with a potential agent, a Soviet assistant air attache gave the advice that this potential agent should not tell anyone about their meetings as some people might misinterpret their relationship. More forthright indications were expressed

by other Soviet representatives who bluntly told their agents that there might be trouble if they were found together or that they did not want the FBI to know of their meetings.

A ready recognition of the inherent contradiction involved in the utilization of meetings as an operational method will assist the reader in interpreting not only the nature of covert personal contact methods but also other covert operational methods which relate to the desirability of utilizing this operational procedure.

B. Time and Frequency

Although there were several variations relating to time and frequency of the meetings considered, they generally could be included in two general categories. These might be called regularly scheduled meetings and spasmodic meetings.

In the cases reviewed, the regularly scheduled meetings were usually identified with well-established intelligence operations. In one such operation in early 1952, the Soviet assistant naval attache advised the agent of a skeleton schedule for the coming year. This schedule provided for meetings on the first Saturday of March, June, September and December. However, for the most part, the regularly scheduled meetings were set up singularly at the time of the preceding meeting. Perhaps to avoid

forgetting, several of the Soviet representatives handled the scheduling of the next meeting as the first order of business during their personal contact.

The spasmodic meeting technique rested upon the Soviet or his agent successfully communicating to each other their respective desires to schedule a meeting. Obviously, there had to be some sort of control exercised by the Soviet in connection with these spasmodic meetings. One Soviet told his agent that they should meet once a month unless good reason existed for meeting more frequently. This same Soviet had meetings held in temporary abeyance on another occasion due to the "Korean situation" in 1950. Other control factors identified were the Soviet representative's instruction that he would signal the next meeting, a false communication to the agent indicating that the Soviet had other business commitments, or the more frequent failure of the Soviet to appear and consummate the requested meeting.

This last circumstance made even more important the desirability of alternate meeting arrangements. One general arrangement was to have an alternate meeting one week later at the same time. If the first alternate meeting failed, then the second alternate date would come on the same day during the next week. In one operation, this was further supplemented by

providing two different times on the alternate meeting day. The alternate time came one hour later. Another complexity added to the alternate meeting picture was the possibility that the alternate meeting might take place at a different prearranged location.

Other time and frequency factors were noted, such as the desire of one Soviet to have shorter meetings and the desire of others to interchange material with their agents under the cover of darkness. Perhaps more significant was the readiness to meet with the agent when he had obtained intelligence data.

C. Meeting Patterns

An appraisal of meetings between the Soviet military, naval and air representatives in the United States since 1950 suggested the organization of this material into two categorical considerations. The first consideration was the progressive development of stages of the meeting patterns. The second consideration was the locales related to the meeting patterns.

In studying the meeting patterns, the strong influence of security precautions was noted. This resulted in the following progressive meeting patterns:


1. Tactics preceding preliminary contacts,
2. Preliminary contacts, *

*For the purposes of this study they are limited to those situations where more than one contact with the agent occurred on the same date.

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MEETING PATTERNS, SOVIET MILITARY, NAVAL AND AIR REPRESENTATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1950-1954

**CHART
A**



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3. Tactics following preliminary or preceding main contacts,
4. Main contacts, and
5. Tactics following main contacts.

These meetings generally were concentrated in the geographic area including the eastern cities, Washington, D. C., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and New York City, New York. The utilization of meeting locales varied. They included the home city of the agent, the assigned location of the Soviet, or a location foreign to both the agent and the Soviet. More specifically, the meeting locales related to the meetings under consideration included:

1. City streets,
2. Restaurants or hotel dining rooms,
3. Automobiles, *
4. Isolated areas or parks,
5. Hotel and building lobbies,
6. Soviet residences or establishments,
7. Movies,
8. Railroad or air terminals, and
9. Addresses of agents.


*Significance is considered in terms of a meeting locale or related security tactics, but not in terms of simply a medium of transportation.

For those interested in a more detailed appraisal of these meeting patterns two charts follow. First, Chart A concerns the progressive development of meeting patterns and the related locales. This is not to be regarded as a summary of all meetings under study. Instead, this chart intends to set out the various patterns without repeating such patterns in the absence of special circumstances which contributed a new factor to the pattern. Meetings not consummated due to the failure of either party to appear have not been included in this chart.

Chart A is supplemented by Chart B which illustrates a simple city street contact between an agent and a new Soviet principal.

A review of these charts may give a basis to the reader for an understanding of the counterintelligence problems involved in identifying and covering meetings of this nature.

CITY STREET CONTACT WITH NEW SOVIET PRINCIPAL



V. SOVIET WEAKNESSES

A. General

An examination of the covert Soviet military, naval and air operations suggested several weaknesses. These weaknesses as a counterintelligence potential may be considered in two categories. First, the consideration of personal weaknesses of the various Soviets and secondly, the organizational weaknesses evidenced by their activities.

B. Personal

The personal weaknesses of note were those which might modify the effectiveness of their covert operations. Those identified in these operations were of a nature which might be considered breaches of discipline or having the potential of compromising the individual Soviet.

An often identified personal weakness was the potential presented by the excessive and, in some instances, the unorthodox use of intoxicating drinks. Although the use of intoxicants during the course of covert meetings might have been designed to assist the Soviets in their relationships with their agents or potential agents, there appeared a valid question as to whether some of the Soviets had not lost control of its application to the point of a breach of discipline.

Personal dishonesty, another weakness, was identified with a long-standing covert operation. One of the Soviet principals carrying out this operation was openly dishonest to his agent. This Soviet caused the agent to sign receipts for payments in excess of the amounts actually

received. This resulted in a situation where the Soviet did not have to account for certain funds to his superiors. Obviously this gave the agent a weapon against his Soviet principal.

C. Operational

The more readily identified weaknesses of these Soviets related to their covert operational procedures. These weaknesses might be grouped briefly as follows:

1. Confusion in connection with covert meetings.

This weakness resulted in the improper implementation of planned security precautions or even the inability to consummate a signaled meeting. Complex meeting techniques, insufficient or inadequate planning, last minute changes in plans and some degree of a language barrier between the Soviet and his agent were weaknesses identified with these operations which might have been the causes for this confusion.

2. Improper discussions between the Soviet and his agent.

This involved unwarranted discussion of personal matters relating to other Soviet representatives or operational weaknesses which did not directly concern the agent. This weakness was in evidence particularly when the Soviet principal was unable to cope with an inquiry or operational criticism of the agent.

3. Immature or unstable reactions during the course of covert contacts.

On one occasion a Soviet assistant air attache met an agent in a clandestine manner. However, when the agent passed intelligence data to the Soviet while walking along the city street, the Soviet took the data out of the envelope and openly viewed and discussed the data. An opposite reaction

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was displayed in another situation involving a Soviet assistant air attache. During the course of a street contact, the Soviet became flustered when the agent attempted to pass the previously requested intelligence data. At first the Soviet refused to accept the data. After walking a short distance, he became more composed and accepted it.

These weaknesses may be considered not only as fostering inadequate operational security, but also as having a deteriorating effect on the confidence and cooperation of the agent.

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SOVIET MILITARY, NAVAL
AND
AIR REPRESENTATIVES
IN
THE UNITED STATES

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COVERT OPERATIONAL METHODS

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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